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Traditional explanations of why countries want nuclear
weapons rely upon external variables to explain nuclear
desires. Quite often, nuclear desires are viewed as a
response to perceived insecurity or aspirations for
international prestige. This thesis asserts that nuclear
desires might arise independently of such explanations
(security/prestige)
.
Socially constructed collective beliefs regarding the
alleged utility of atomic technology might drive state
efforts to pursue nuclear weapons. Evidence of such
collective beliefs can be found in cultural texts and
statements by social elites. The images these texts and
statements create are manifested in social discourse. This
thesis posits that examining an historical case through the
social discourse level of analysis will provide clues
regarding the sources of nuclear desires. The historical
case is the United States.
Nearly all examinations of the U.S. decision to "go
nuclear" cite fears of an alleged German nuclear program as
the fundamental cause. Ignored in most of this research is
the essential issue of how and why U.S. decision makers had
come to view nuclear weapons as an appropriate security
strategy. That is, could the views U.S. decision makers
held regarding nuclear energy influence their decision-
making process?
XI
The events leading up to the establishment of the
Manhattan project in 1943 suggest that collective beliefs
regarding nuclear technology were indeed significant.
President Franklin Roosevelt was consistently presented with
nuclear myths which described the destructive potential of
nuclear energy. It has been well documented that he did not
fear a German nuclear program and was in fact interested in
the offensive capabilities of nuclear weapons. Roosevelt's
perception of those offensive capabilities were shaped by
the nuclear myths he learned from his trusted advisors. The
result of the myths may have been the Manhattan Project.
There are policy implications from this proposition. If
beliefs about the utility of atomic technology precipitate
nuclear desires, then U.S. intelligence must accomplish four
tasks to understand the motivations of states to pursue
nuclear programs: 1) recognize that not all desires for
nuclear weapons can be explained by traditional analytical
frameworks, 2) acknowledge that perhaps culturally produced
collective beliefs influence decision making, 3) understand
that those beliefs will be manifested in cultural texts
(books, periodicals, movies), and 4) attempt to connect the
beliefs described above with either state action or
statements by policy makers.
XII
I . INTRODUCTION
American nuclear scientists gathered together at Los
Alamos, New Mexico, in March 1943 to produce an atomic bomb.
This U.S. Government effort, the "Manhattan Project," has
been the subject of much scholarship. Nearly all
examinations of the U.S. decision to "go nuclear" cite fears
of an alleged German nuclear program as the fundamental
cause. Ignored in most of this research is the essential
issue of how and why U.S. decision makers had come to view a
nuclear program as an appropriate security strategy. More
specifically, the following questions arise: 1) What were
popular and elite U.S. perceptions regarding the utility of
atomic technology prior to 1945? 2) What were the sources of
those perceptions regarding nuclear energy? and 3) Did those
perceptions influence U.S. nuclear decision-making?
There are compelling reasons to explore these
questions. "Realist" interpretations of early U.S. nuclear
decision-making stress the significance of German nuclear
activity. 1 While fears of a Nazi bomb provide an enticing
argument, there remain limitations to this "security"
1 For discussions regarding "Realist" perspectives of
political phenomena see Robert Keohane, "Realism,
Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics," and "Theory of
World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," both in
Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1966)
.
explanation. 2 If early U.S. decision making was motivated
by fears of Germany, why did an American scientist patent a
process for constructing atomic bombs in 1936, years before
this German threat had materialized in the consciousness of
the American public? 3 How do we account for the U.S.
government sponsoring efforts to research nuclear bombs over
two years prior to American entry into World War II? 4 The
facts of U.S. civilian and government nuclear research do
not support the argument that fears of Germany motivated
U.S. nuclear desires. There must be an alternative
explanation.
I assert that socially constructed nuclear myths are a
necessary condition for the emergence of nuclear desires.
2 Traditional explanations of why countries want nuclear
weapons are dominated by two Realist arguments: 1) countries
desire nuclear weapons to allay an alleged security threat,
or 2) countries desire nuclear weapons because such weapons
are viewed as trappings of national grandeur. For
additional information regarding commonly accepted
interpretations of nuclear desires see Benjamin Frankel,
"International Political Changes and Nuclear Proliferation
in the 1990 f s", Eric Arnett, ed., Science and International
Security: Responding to a Changing World (Washington:
American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1990)
;
and George Quester, "Conceptions of Nuclear Threshold
Status," Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Security With Nuclear
Weapons? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
.
3 Mick Broderick, Nuclear Movies (Jefferson: MacFarland and
Company, 1991), 55. Leo Szilard was the scientist.
4 James MacGregor Burns, Franklin Roosevelt: Soldier of
Freedom (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970), 249.
This study offers an analysis of factors which may
contribute to nuclear desires, not a theory for their
development. Desires for nuclear weapons can arise
independently of traditional explanations (insecurity,
prestige) . They can arise as the result of the digestion of
cultural texts and statements by influential elites. I will
suggest that the beliefs decision makers hold regarding the
utility of atomic technology, beliefs which are socially
constructed, drive efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.
A. PURPOSE OF THESIS AND CASE STUDY SELECTION
I examine the U.S. decision to pursue nuclear weapons
"heuristically.
"
5 The objective of this thesis, a
"heuristic case study, " is to "stimulate the imagination" by
identifying possible theoretical solutions to a problem and
formulating general relations which were not previously
apparent. 6 In doing so, those theoretical solutions and
general relations may become useful in attempts to
5 Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political
Science," F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds
.
, Handbook
of Political Science (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 113.
Arend Lijphart refers to heuristic case studies as
"hypothesis-generating" - see his "Comparative Politics and
the Comparative Method, " American Political Science Review
Vol 65 (September 1971).
6 Alexander George, "Case Study and Theory Development" The
Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," Hall, Gordon, and
Lauren, eds., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory,
and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), 53.
understand contemporary nuclear desires. This thesis does
not generate a set of theoretical propositions which can be
empirically demonstrated. However, I believe that examining
U.S. decision making at an often ignored level of analysis
will generate connections between the sources of beliefs
about the utility of nuclear technology and desires for
nuclear weapons. Therefore, the value added of this thesis
is three-fold: 1) introduce a new level of analysis for
explaining nuclear desires, 2) promote a new interpretation
of the U.S. decision to pursue nuclear weapons, and 3)
provide a new approach for understanding current desires for
nuclear weapons.
The case of the United States is examined for several
reasons. First, the United States qualifies as a "hard"
case. 7 It. is widely agreed that the U.S. nuclear program
sprouted from threats to U.S. national security during World
War II. However, others assert that the principal
motivation for U.S. pursuit of nuclear weapons existed
independently of the German threat. As Richard Rhodes
asserts, "Roosevelt was surprisingly indifferent to German
7 A "hard" case, of course, would be a country which it is
generally recognized faced a clear, nuclear threat and
decided to allay such a threat with possession of nuclear
weapons. Examples of current nuclear capable states would
include Israel, Russia, and the United States. An easier
case to study would be countries which pursued nuclear
weapons in the absence of such a threat - Argentina, Brazil,
and South Africa.
nuclear activity. . .he was interested in the offensive
capabilities of an atomic bomb." 8 Furthermore, neither
Roosevelt nor any of his primary nuclear lieutenants ever
sought information regarding Germany's flailing nuclear
program (Hitler had announced his indifference to nuclear
weapons by 1942). 9
The U.S. decision to pursue nuclear weapons is a "hard"
case for another important reason. "Nuclear technology," or
practical applications of atomic science, did not exist when
the United States decided to seek nuclear weapons. Not only
did beliefs about the utility of atomic technology exist
prior to the establishment of a U.S. atomic bomb program,
but those beliefs were seductive enough to convince decision
makers of their viability.
Dominant collective beliefs regarding the utility of
atomic technology are the focus of this study. Collective
beliefs arise from a social process. First, there are
cultural referents which represent nuclear technology in a
certain manner. Nuclear technology as "destructive" or
"productive" are examples of such images. These images are
8 Richard Rhodes, The Making of Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1987), 405. Rhodes further asserts that
Roosevelt's motivation to develop atomic bombs transcended
the "war America had not entered. . .he was thinking about a
military development that would change the political
organization of the world." pp. 379.
9 Ibid, 405.
refined into "myths." Myths are "collective beliefs whose
truth or reality is accepted uncritically." 10 "Nuclear
myths" are such beliefs about the utility of nuclear
technology. Nuclear myths become the "operational code" of
decision makers when those decision makers are presented
with the myths from credible, trustworthy advisors. 11 In
early twentieth century America, nuclear myths existed along
a continuum with polar opposites of "atomic terror" and
"atomic Utopia." "Atomic terror" described an era of
destructive weapons which provided the possessor unheralded
political power. "Atomic Utopia" described an era of cheap,
nuclear derived electricity and atomic powered vehicles.
10
"Myths," Random House College Dictionary . Revised ed.,:
882. There are divergent definitions of "nuclear myths" in
nuclear proliferation literature. Peter Lavoy, in "Nuclear
Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation, " Security
Studies Vol 2 (Spring/ Summer 1993) defines nuclear myths as
"unverifiable truths" and "cognitive responses to the
uncertain consequences of nuclear weapons acquisition and
key components of national political ideologies." By
contrast, I argue that there are no "uncertain consequences"
about nuclear myths - decision-makers want nuclear weapons
because nuclear myths provide them with coherent perceptions
regarding the utility of atomic technology.
11 Alexander George, "The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive
Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: the Operational code
Belief System," Lawrence Falkwoski, ed., Psychological
Models in International Politics (Boulder: Westview Press,
1979) . "Operational code" beliefs are examined further in
chapter 3.
B. AN ALTERNATIVE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
Robert Jervis, in Percept ion and Misperception in
International Politics
, identifies four levels of analysis
for studying international relations: 1) the "decision
making" level which emphasizes the importance of individual
decision makers in the process of political outcomes; 2) the
"bureaucracy" level which stresses the significance of
bureaucratic inertia and the effect of bureaucratic
organizations on the development of political outcomes; 3)
the "international" level which accents the import of
external international variables to political decisions; and
4) the "nature of the state" level which describes how
domestic politics influences political decisions. 12 This
study departs from the fourth level.
The "state" level of analysis explains policies as a
result of variations in social and economic structures. 13
Thus, the social and economic structure of the state is the
variable under consideration. I assert that there is an
additional level of analysis which is similar to the "nature
of the state" but exists independently of domestic politics
12 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976), 15-30.
13 Ibid, 21.
and structure. This level, the "social discourse," is the
methodological focus of this thesis.
The "social discourse" level of analysis explains
variations in political outcomes through variations in
socially constructed, collective perceptions. To utilize
this level, it is necessary to demonstrate three fundamental
propositions: 1) collective beliefs exist, 2) collective
beliefs are dynamic (they can change over time), and 3)
collective beliefs influence the decision-making process. I
argue that collective beliefs about the utility of nuclear
technology, which result from nuclear myths, are the cause
of a country's early desires for nuclear weapons. That is,
not only do socially constructed, collective beliefs about
the utility of nuclear technology exist (described further
in chapters two and three) , but those beliefs may be the
crucial variable in explaining early nuclear desires.
Furthermore, I assert that images of nuclear technology
are unique. They are "unique" because myths regarding
practical applications of atomic science, from the very
beginning, have been imbued with widespread popular
fascination and political power. The myths have been
presented as subjective knowledge. Therefore, this study
"interpenetrates" levels of analysis to connect the myths to
beliefs about nuclear technology. 14
14 Phillip Tetlock, "Methodological Themes and Variations,"
Phillip Tetlock, Jo Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul Stern,
8
C. DESCRIPTION OF CHAPTERS
This thesis is divided into three sections. Chapter II
describes the evolution of nuclear myths in pre-1945
America. I survey pre-1945 American periodicals, books,
plays, movies, and statements by influential elites which
speculated on the future utility of atomic technology. I
survey the social discourse regarding the utility of nuclear
technology. Additionally, I discuss the growth of the
social significance of science and the increased prestige
afforded scientists during this pre-World War II period.
This chapter shows that cultural texts contribute to popular
and elite perceptions of nuclear technology.
Chapter III discusses how nuclear myths become a social
discourse. The chapter begins by describing how the nuclear
images presented in chapter two developed into nuclear
myths. I then discuss how the myths coalesced into
subjective knowledge about the future utility of atomic
technology. Because the myth of atomic terror was dominant,
it became the common way to think about nuclear technology.
Charles Tilly, eds
.
, Behavior. Society, and Nuclear War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 366. Tetlock states
that through "interpenetration of levels of analysis ... (it
can be shown) that micro-level processes are constrained,
shaped, and transformed by social systems." Also, the
"content of thought - the policy options considered are
dominated by the policy makers perception of macrolevel
variables." The operative level of analysis for this
thesis, the social discourse, are Tetlock' s "macrolevel
variables .
"
U.S. decision makers were provided with definitive ideas
about atomic bombs long before any such bombs were
constructed.
Chapter IV describes the events which led to the
establishment of the Manhattan Project in New Mexico. While
it is true that President Roosevelt decided to sponsor an
effort to construct atomic bombs in 1939, there were other
U.S. elites who helped launch the U.S. nuclear weapons
program. I discuss how two of these elites (Leo Szilard and
Vannevar Bush) used nuclear myths to convince Roosevelt to
pursue the bomb. It is important to note that the elites
who persuaded Roosevelt were equally as susceptible to pre-
existing nuclear myths.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE
In April 1996 the U.S. Secretary of Defense issued
guidance to the military services describing the nuclear
proliferation threat and the manner in which the Department
of Defense would counter it. The document, entitled
Proliferation: Threat and Response , directs military
intelligence to "assist the Department of Defense
officials . . . (by) providing accurate and timely assessments
on the motivations and plans of leaders (who desire to
acquire nuclear weapons)." 15
15 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat
and Response (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 55.
10
For 40 years the U.S. Government has thwarted efforts
of foreign governments to acquire nuclear weapons. The
principal mechanism for doing so has been to deny states the
capability to produce atomic bombs. This emphasis on denial
is manifested in international agreements which restrict the
transfer of fissile material. Efforts to understand why
countries want nuclear weapons often have been ignored.
The United States spends untold dollars for its
intelligence organizations to predict accurately and
understand the capabilities of existing and potential
nuclear nations. This is productive. Cognizance of global
nuclear weapons activities is high on the agenda of American
foreign policy. Also, U.S. support of the international
nuclear non-proliferation regime obligates U.S. intelligence
to be a world wide leader in predicting future proliferation
problems. To accomplish this monumental task, all aspects
of the proliferation problem must be addressed. U.S.
intelligence must make serious attempts to understand why




"Cultural texts do not simply reveal the views of our era
or some other, but the debates and dialectical tensions that
structure the historical process that produces views."
Jeff Smith, Unthinking the Unthinkable
Images of nuclear technology for peaceful and military
uses emerged in the United States at least 40 years prior to
the production of atomic bombs. Between 1900 and 1945
scientists, authors, and journalists shaped and spread
speculative images of what a "nuclear era" would look like.
Such image crafting produced coherent, powerful, and
persuasive perceptions of the utility of atomic technology.
This section describes the evolution of collective
beliefs about nuclear technology. I identify the cultural
media which contributed to popular and elite perceptions
about the possibilities of a nuclear future. These images
of the utility of nuclear technology then became nuclear
myths. Nuclear myths coalesced into what Alexander George
characterizes as an "operational code" of beliefs. 16 It is
demonstrated in subsequent chapters that nuclear myths
facilitated the U.S. decision in 1939 to pursue atomic
bombs.
Prior to 1945 there were two distinct images of a
nuclear future: 1) "atomic terror" dominated by ruinous and
16 Alexander George, "The Causal Nexus," 95. Nuclear myths
became the operational code of U.S. decision makers.
13
destructive bombs, and 2) "atomic Utopia" characterized by-
cheap electricity and world peace. The fundamental
difference between the two myths was the conflicting
perception regarding the future utility of atomic
techn logy. Would nuclearism usher in an era of peace,
tranquillity, and a figurative return to the forbidden
Garden of Eden? Or could the application of atomic
technology signal doomsday for humankind?
Such a dichotomy of beliefs required reconciliation.
One cannot happily wander the majestic Garden certain of a
horrible and disfigured death. One of the perceptions would
saturate the consciousness of American society. 17 One would
lead decision makers to covet the political power inherited
through mastery of atomic technology.
In this chapter, I survey elements of American popular
culture, scientific journals, and statements by influential
elites which inspired images of nuclear technology. From
1900 to 1945, widely circulated novels and popular motion
pictures served as cultural texts for these emerging myths.
The credibility of these texts (and the images) was enhanced
17 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks ,
Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, ed. and trans.,
(New York: Lawrence and Wishart, 1974), 235. Gramsci writes
of "hegemony." I assert that one of the images of atomic
technology would become hegemonic because it was the view
which would be unconsciously absorbed by the American public
and U.S. decision makers as a collective belief.
14
further by articles in daily newspapers and scientific
journals. Such articles were often authored by reputable
and well-known scientists and journalists.
The appearance of mature images of nuclear technology
paralleled an increased social prestige for science. As the
dawn of the "scientific revolution," the first half of the
twentieth century confirmed scientists as social,
intellectual and political elites. 18
A. POPULAR CULTURE
Throughout the nineteenth century, a number of English
language apocalyptic works of fiction popularized the notion
that human civilization was doomed. Obviously, this was
nothing new. Since humans have been speaking and writing,
there have been mythical tales of impending disaster. What
separated the novels of the nineteenth century from the
folklore which preceded them was their treatment of the
subject. Whereas earlier myths detailed calamities which
were out of human control, nineteenth century American
popular culture introduced the unthinkable - doomsday
precipitated by the actions of humans.
18 Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons
Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 4.
Gilpin discusses the scientific revolution — not the
increased social prestige of science.
15
Biblical tales not withstanding, the late nineteenth
century witnessed the emergence of detailed examples of
widespread, human-wrought disaster. Spencer Weart, in
Nuclear Fear: A History of Images
, acknowledges Mary
Shelley's The Last Man (1826) and Frankenstein (1818) as
well as Jules Verne's Five Weeks in a Balloon (1862) and For
the Flag (1896) as examples of such literature. 19 While
none of these books described nuclear related catastrophe,
they clearly introduced a new idea. This idea, that the
power to destroy the earth rested in the less than capable
hands of humankind, would prove useful to the impending
stories which crafted an image of nuclear technology.
H. G. Wells, among "the most influential (English
language) authors of the era," published The World Set Free
in 1914. 20 This novel can be viewed as a watershed in the
history of nuclear myths. Wells had fascinated millions of
Americans with his mischievous tales of time travel, island-
bound mutants, and humans in flight. The World Set Free was
something of a departure from his customary fiction. By
using the name of a familiar and contemporary U.S. scientist
(Fredrick Soddy) and focusing upon a swiftly growing yet
largely unknown science (atomic energy) , Wells captured
19 See Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images




readers' imagination with his descriptions of atomic
battles, atomic bombs, and atomic aftermath.
Wells so meticulously described his atomic era, which
incidentally began in 1945, that he saw fit to identify the
essential element of atomic weapons. "Carolinum," the
fictional equivalent to the recently discovered radium, was
"the most potent degenerator known to man." 21 Radium, which
nearly everyone in 1914 knew, was a mysterious and
fascinating element known to kill mice, burn the skin, and
inspire fear in atomic scientists. 22 Wells exploited this
perception of degenerative atomic elements for the purpose
of making his element, and atomic war, more plausible. He
writes of how one person could carry Carolinum in a handbag
with "an amount of latent energy sufficient to wreck half a
city." 23 The laboratory experiments with radiation (dead
mice and irritable skin burns) paled in comparison to Wells'
destructive images of degenerative elements (a leveled
metropolis)
.
In addition to the accounts of atomic elements, Wells'
description of the atomic battles must have offered little
comfort to the reader. A central theme of the book, which
21 H. G. Wells, The World Set Free (London: MacMillian and
Co., 1914), 101.
22 Weart, Nuclear Images , 36.
23 Wells, The World Set Free , 104.
17
Wells brilliantly conveys through his battle narratives, is
that the power to destroy through the mysterious ways of
science is ever increasing. The atomic battle accounts are
brief yet unnerving. Wells provides graphic representations
of atomic bomb effects. For instance, after dropping their
knapsack-sized atomic bombs, airplane pilots looked down
upon "a blazing, continual explosion. . .which emit(ed) a
furious radiation of energy". 24 Later the combatants (and
readers) are treated to the following:
the bomb spread itself out into a monstrous
cavern of fiery energy at the base of what
became very speedily a miniature active volcano. 25
Lawrence Freedman states that through these "fiery. . .active
volcanoes .. .entire centers of population (were obliterated
through) atomic warfare." 26
In Wells' book, such devastation caused by atomic bombs
translated into "a sense of destruction so far reaching and
of a world so altered that it seemed foolish to go in any
direction." 27 Statements such as this demonstrate that
Wells envisioned a surreal feeling of disconnect associated
with atomic warfare. His characters must have experienced
24 Ibid, 101.
25 Ibid, 102.
26 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 10.
27 Wells, The World Set Free , 128.
intense feelings of separation, helplessness, and
annihilation after the atomic bombs were dropped. 28 There
was a sense that hope was lost. The atomic terror images
offered by Wells, again, were of total destruction.
Though by no means flooding the market of ideas in the
realm of popular culture, there were other pre-1945 media
which offered nuclear fantasies. Penguin Island
, which was
written by Anatole France and published in 1909, detailed
the exploits of physics-minded terrorists who were
determined to blow up the world with their pocket-sized
atomic bombs. 29 Later, there was a notable 1938 novel which
featured a character intent upon ending the world through a
nuclear explosion which could "peel the skin off the earth
like an orange, only faster." 30 Children and young adults
were exposed to similar images while reading comic books
which ranged in popularity from the venerable Batman to the
now defunct Dr. Radium . Though not a novel, the traveling
stage show Wings over Europe (which appeared in New York in
1928 and remained a popular college theater production)
28 Robert Jay Lifton, Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 486. Lifton states
that such feelings were common among survivors of the
Hiroshima bomb.
29 Weart, Nuclear Fear
, 23.
30 John B. Priestley, The Doomsday Men: An Adventure
(London: Heinemann, 1938), 277.
19
centered around a youthful scientist who allegedly-
discovered the secret to releasing atomic energy. The
scientist, Francis Lightfoot, proclaimed he had "the power
of... a god, to slay and make alive.
"
31
In 1940, Time magazine published an article entitled
"Atomic Power in Ten Years?" Nestled between advertisements
for high-powered telescopes and bourbon whiskey, this
article was later characterized by the U.S. Congress as a
"guide" to understanding atomic power. 32 As such, the
article details the late 1930 's advances with uranium and
the immense energy derived from its nuclear bombardment.
Toward the end, the article turns to probable applications
of atomic technology. The last sentence of the article, the
last impression left to the reader, is the following:
Still in the distant future is the old dream
of cracking a cup full of atoms to drive
locomotives, blow up the Western Front. 33
So it is that there were readily available popular media,
prior to 1945, which represented atomic energy as a
31 Weart, Nuclear Fear . 19. From Robert Nichols and Maurice
Browne, Wings over Europe; a dramatic extravaganza on a
pressing theme (1928; New York: S. French, 1935).
32 Senate Subcommitte on War Mobilization of the Committee
on Military Affairs, The Social Impact of Science: A Select
Bibliography , 79th Congress, 1st session, 1945, S. Res 107
and S. Res 146, pp. 49. The article was listed with various
other selections which would acquaint the public with the
possibilities of atomic power.
33
"Atomic Power in Ten Years?" Time May 27, 1940: 44.
20
potentially massive destructive force - a force which, once
harnessed, could provide the possessor power heretofore only
imagined.
Co-existing with these popular atomic terror images
were texts detailing an atomic Utopia. Harper'
s
magazine
hailed a "new era" of atomic cars, atomic railroads, and
atomic ships. 34 Indeed, a significant number of periodical
titles detailing atomic technology, prior to World War II,
described civilian uses with clearly positive
implications. 35 Throughout the 1930' s, many Americans
received radiation treatment to cure various ailments.
However, the atomic Utopia articles which presented imagery
as concrete and detailed as Wells and Time were few and far
between. Atomic utopia was abstract - it was derived from a
new source of intangible energy. Atomic terror was
frightening - readers could connect atomic bombs with their
city. In any case, popular culture provided two images of
the nuclear future.
34 J. J. O'Neill, "Enter Atomic Power," Harper's June 1940
7. This article was also listed in the Senate study "The
Social Impact of Science." O'Neill goes so far as to
speculate on the future downfall of resource dependent
industries as a result of the pending atomic revolution.
35 Weart, Nuclear Fear , 387.
21
B. NUCLEAR FILMS (PRE-1945)
Films are regarded as elements of popular culture;
however, I have separated nuclear films from other nuclear
related popular media because the former has coalesced into
a genre. There were no fewer than 14 atomic-related motion
pictures released prior to August 1945. 36 The majority of
such movies borrowed their narrative structure from
established American popular media. Most nuclear films
portrayed an era of atomic terror. Early atomic cinema
treated atomic energy as a mysterious yet powerful force;
early atomic cinema provided yet more cultural referents for
images of nuclear technology.
In 1917, three years after the publication of Wells'
The World Set Free . Metro/Wolf studios released The Greatest
Power . In this film, a scientist accidentally invents a
nuclear "exonite" super-bomb which is capable of destroying
the planet. After agonizing over the potential (mis) use of
the weapon, he decides to inform the American government. 37
The Invisible Ray , released in 1920, is the story of a
mineralogist who finds an atomic ray lethal to humans. The
ray is highly sought after by international terrorists who
intend to use it to gain world power. 38 Dr. Cyclops , which




appeared in 1939, revolves around a mad scientist who
discovers huge radium deposits in the South American jungle.




Such films (which were all released by American motion
picture studios) are representative, in both content and
format, of many atomic motion pictures which appeared before
1945. In fact, of all 14 pre-1945 atomic movies listed in
Mick Broderick's Nuclear Movies , the only "positive" images
offered were of the riches garnered through possession of
atomic elements. 40 The central theme is identical to that
presented through other cultural media - the destructive
potential of atomic energy bequeaths unrivaled power to he
who possesses it.
Admittedly, of all the books written, plays screened,
comics read, and movies seen, prior to 1945, those which
detailed atomic-related phenomena were in the minority. All
social discourse was not dominated by nuclear fantasies.
However, the nuclear fantasies which did exist gained
credibility through the emergence of key influential elites.
Scientists and journalists who were contemporaries of this
39 Ibid, 5!
40 Ibid, 57-58. Films such as Broadway or Bust (1924) and
£q_1o1(1934) detail ranchers and scientists, respectively, who
finnagle their possession of atomic elements into wealth.
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pre-1945 atomic media contributed to these rapidly
developing myths of atomic technology.
C. SCIENTISTS, JOURNALISTS, ELITES
Fifty years separate the discovery of X-rays from the
detonation of the first atomic bomb. In that period, there
were a number of historical landmarks in the development of
images of nuclear technology. Prior to World War I, atomic
discoveries focused on understanding the potential of the
new science. Possible applications for atomic energy
emerged in the 1920' s and 1930' s. The most interesting
facet of the atomic advances of the early twentieth century
are the speculations based upon these advances. It was not
enough for scientists and journalists to report their
achievements; many were compelled to interpret the meaning
of their accomplishments. Many scientists framed their
increasingly meaningful atomic triumphs in language anyone
could understand; they successfully shifted their micro-
scale laboratory experiments into macro-scale imagery. In
doing so, they were establishing a standard dialogue which
would become inseparable from perceptions of nuclear
technology.
The 50 years between the discovery of X-rays and
Hiroshima is also an important period in the history of
science, especially when one considers the role of science
and scientists in society. Atomic energy, coming as it did
24
on the heels of the Industrial Revolution, was another
significant advance in the course of human history. In
fact, the twentieth century has been characterized as the
age of the "scientific revolution." 41 Not only did this
"revolution" increase human power to destroy, but it
precipitated a more prestigious social role for scientists.
Science, the American public believed, was the
"unearthing of rational, theoretically valid, systemic
knowledge." 42 Atomic energy was crucial to the
popularization of science; scientists "did physics because
it was there to be done and because it was wonderfully
interesting." 43 In fact, atomic energy fit perfectly with
the scientific ego-centric view that scientists worked on
important problems which were "interesting" to the public. 44
Because they provided elegant solutions and offered "simple"
results, scientists became elites to be respected. 45 They
were creative, dedicated and selfless servants to the
41 Gilpin, American Scientists
, 4.
42 Hans Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master (New York:
New American Library, 1972), 2.
43 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the
Atomic Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random
House, 1988), 4.
44 Abraham Maslow, The Psychology of Science (New York:
Harper and Row, 1966), 122.
45 Ibid, 122.
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betterment of humankind and subsequently were exalted for
their quest for truth. 46
Essentially, science and scientists became
"functionally autonomous" from public scrutiny. 47 However,
science is a human enterprise and "as a social institution
has goals, ethics, morals and purposes," science is pursued
in the service of values. 48 Scientists who speculated upon
applications of atomic energy manipulated this "myth of the
autonomy of science." 49 They knew that their statements
would be digested without question because they were
"unearthing rational and theoretically valid" knowledge. In
any case, early in the twentieth century people began to
listen when scientists spoke and scientific research became
a major element of national power.
46 Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy .
2.
47 Maslow, The Psychology of Science . 33. In the early
twentieth century (and to some extent today) , scientists
were free to speculate on the applications of their
laboratory experiments without question. Quite often,
because of the social prestige accumulated by scientists,
such speculations were instrumental to the formation of
coherent nuclear imagery.
48 Ibid, 127, 123.
49 Bruno Latour, "Give Me a Laboratory and I will Raise the
World," Karin Knorr and Michael Mulkay, eds
.
, Science
Observed (London: Sage Press, 1983), 145.
26
Perhaps this fact is best illustrated in a speech
President Roosevelt gave to the Eighth Pan American
Scientific Congress in Washington, D. C, in early 1940.
Roosevelt described a twentieth century phenomenon which was
precipitated by atomic science - the marriage of scientific
research to American national power.
Science (Roosevelt said) can be used to
destroy as well as to create... If death is
desired, science can do that... You and I, in
the long run if it be necessary, will act
together to protect and defend by every means
at our command our science, our culture, our
American freedom and our civilization... 50
Roosevelt and the American public had been listening to the
nearly forty years of scientific prognostications regarding
atomic energy - prognostications which began to emerge in
1901.
In 1901 two chemistry professors, Frederick Soddy and
Ernest Rutherford, discovered that radioactivity was a sign
of fundamental changes within matter. 51 Not content simply
to report their findings, Soddy proclaimed in 1903:
our planet is a storehouse stuffed with explosives
inconceivably more powerful than any we know of,
and only possibly awaiting a suitable detonator
to cause the earth to revert to chaos. 52
50 Quoted in, Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom , 250.
51 Weart, Nuclear Fear , 5. A later article by Rutherford,
"Transmutation of matter," would also make the U. S.
Senate's list of "guides" to understanding atomic energy.
52 Frederick Soddy, "Some Recent Advances in Radioactivity,
"
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This statement, published 11 years before Wells' The World
Set Free and over 40 years before Hiroshima, was among the
first of scientific myths explaining the destructive power
of atomic energy. It was also among the very first examples
of a scientist who successfully translated laboratory
experiments into tenable, real world achievements.
Soddy and Rutherford articulated their laboratory
advances in such a way that certainty in the lab became
certainty outside the lab. 53 Soddy later clarified himself
when he stated that the person who "...put his hand upon the
lever (of an atomic bomb) . . .would possess a weapon by which
he could destroy the earth if he chose." 54 Soddy spoke of
political power on the scale of Francis Lightfoot.
In the same year, 1903, a widely published Sunday
newspaper supplement in the New York Times suggested that a
single device, at the touch of a button, could be the
"suitable detonator." Also in 1903, Soddy discovered that
the citizens of Boston were repeating the claims of British
Contemporary Review 83 (May 1903): 708-720. Quoted in
Weart, 17.
53 Latour, "Give Me a Laboratory and I will Raise the
World," 165. Soddy and Rutherford, clearly, made an
important discovery in atomic science. It was their ability
to successfully translate that discovery into something the
average American could understand that is germane. Latour
discusses how Pasteur accomplished a similar feat.
54 Bundy, Danger and Survival , 5.
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physicist Sir William Crookes that atomic energy could "blow
the (whole) British Navy sky high." 55 Though Soddy,
Rutherford and Crookes possessed no empirical basis to
assert such disconcerting claims, they fascinated the public
and inspired the scientific community.
Until the 1930' s, most of the speculation about atomic
energy centered around the aforementioned scientific
assertions. Admittedly, there were scientists and
journalists who disputed the claims that atomic energy would
precipitate the doomsday calculations offered by scientists
such as Soddy and Crookes. There were scientists who
believed in an atomic Utopia. In fact, readers of the New
York Times in the 1920' s and 1930' s were led to believe that
atomic technology someday would power the entire United
States. 56 General Electric supported such notions by
suggesting that electricity would be "too cheap to meter" in
the Utopian future. 57 Senator Sheridan Downey of
California gave credence to such claims when he stated in
1941 that atomic energy means "cheap and unlimited sources
of energy so that airplanes can roam over the world without
returning to the ground for months at a time." 58 He said in
55 Weart, Nuclear Fear . 25.
56 Ibid, 12.
57 Ibid, 12.
58 Senator Sheridan Downey addressing the Senate Military
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the same breath, " (atomic energy) would totally remake the
face of the world." 59 Senator Downey was one of many
influential elites who enjoyed commenting upon the
possibilities of a nuclear future.
Newspapers throughout the United States would closely
follow the exploits of famous physicists in the hopes of
printing the latest news on atomic advances. Scientific
journals, such as Science Today and Tomorrow
,
consistently
published articles by atomic authors. Among the most
influential of those authors was Waldemar Kaempffert.
Kaempffert, who was an editor for the New York Times
and was frequently published in various popular scientific
journals, relied upon the intense public fascination with
the new science of atomic energy for the subject of his
articles. In fact, his primary focus was upon the perceived
benefits of the coming atomic age. He preferred to write of
cheaper and more available atomic-powered transportation and
super atomic gardens. Kaempffert once said sheepishly, "the
temptation to make the most of the drama in an (atomic)
discovery and particularly to extrapolate its consequences
is difficult to resist;" for him atomic energy would become
Affairs Committee, Hearing to Prevent Depletion of the Stock
of Strategic and Critical Materials Available for National




a docile servant of humankind. 60 Some of Kaempffert's
readers misinterpreted his message. In 1931, Phillip H.
Lieb, a concerned citizen, wrote a letter to Kaempffert's
newspaper which pondered whether or not atomic energy would
eventually become a "Golem which would destroy mankind." 61
Lieb's fears are significant because, clearly, they were
based upon something. He connected atomic energy with the
destruction of humankind through his (and the public's)
embryonic knowledge of atomic energy; knowledge which had
been spoon fed through popular culture, newspapers, and
scientists.
Developments in nuclear science and the narrowing of
the focus for images of nuclear technology accelerated
quickly in the 1930' s. The decade before Hiroshima saw the
bombardment of neutrons and the patenting of a process for
the construction of atomic bombs. Scientists such as Niels
Bohr, Enrico Fermi, Albert Einstein, and Leo Szilard were
practicing scientific techniques which, while too
complicated for the average consumer of popular culture,
would have potential "consequences extrapolated."
Among the most influential and prolific of these
"extrapolators" was journalist William L. Laurence of the
60 Waldemar Kaempffert, Explorations in Science (New York:
Viking Press, 1953), Preface, vii.
61 Phillip H. Lieb, New York Times , 7 June 1931, Section 3,
page 2. From Weart , 65.
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New York Times (who was also extensively published in
scientific journals such as Nature and popular magazines
like the Saturday Evening Post ) . Laurence seemed to be
present at (or was compelled to report) every atomic
breakthrough during the decade of the 1930' s. Laurence's
friend Leo Szilard informed him in 1934 what he thought
after he had perfected the process of releasing atomic
energy. Szilard confided in Laurence that as he tried to
sleep that night, "there was little doubt in my mind that
the world was headed for grief." 62
Later, Laurence reported in the New York Times on
February 25, 1939, that Bohr and Fermi, while addressing the
American Physical Society in New York, had revealed that
neutron bombardment had produced a "gigantic radioactive
atomic cannonball of 100,000,000 volts." Laurence
subsequently made himself more clear when he wrote that the
destructive power of releasing atomic energy could equal
approximately 30,000,000 tons of TNT. 63
Laurence was such a well-known and credible atomic
author that an article he wrote for the Saturday Evening
Post was re-published in the Congressional Record. The
article states that a bomb constructed of uranium 235 would
62 Quoted in, William Laurence, Men and Atoms (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1959), 37.
63 Ibid, 4, 47.
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possess explosive power greater than one million times equal
quantities of TNT. 64 While Laurence was often less dramatic
than Kaempffert, the message conveyed to the public and
policy makers in the 1930' s was becoming clear. Atomic
bombs would very soon become a reality; such bombs would be
more destructive than anything heretofore seen.
The two most influential and timely assessments on
images of nuclear technology were tailored for policy makers
and therefore not immediately available to the public. On
August 2, 1939 (more than two years before American entry
into World War II) , Albert Einstein, who had been expelled
from Germany by Hitler and was residing in Long Island,
signed a letter (Szilard had written it) to then American
President Franklin Roosevelt. In that letter, Einstein
briefly reviewed some of the latest breakthroughs in nuclear
physics and named the scientists living in America who were
responsible the advances. More importantly, Einstein
described to the President the possibilities of an atomic
bomb: "A single (atomic) bomb... might very well destroy a
64 William L. Laurence, Exhibit A, Vast Power Source in
Atomic Energy Opened By Sc ience - Relat ive o f Uranium Found
to Yield Force 5,000,000 Times as Potent as Coal - Germany
is Seeking It - Scientists Ordered to Devote All Time to
Research - Tests Made at California
,
7 6th Congress, 2nd
session, Congressional Record, 1940, pp. 10100. The article
was also listed in the Senate's "Social Impact of Science"
bibliography as a "guide" to further understanding of
nuclear science."
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Roosevelt, the former Secretary of the Navy,
undoubtedly understood. Einstein also informed the
President that uranium would soon become a precious element
in short supply - the best ores of uranium were found in
then Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia and the Belgian Congo.
Einstein framed his letter in the context of an inevitable
race with Germany for acquisition of the immensely
destructive atomic bombs. 66 Essentially, he was asking
Roosevelt for funds and an American establishment dedicated
to the research and development of atomic bombs. He did not
ask Roosevelt to fund the development of peaceful
applications of atomic technology; he did not use Utopian
images
.
Attached to Einstein's letter was an addendum by Leo
Szilard. Where Einstein's letter appears more politically
motivated, Szilard was interested in explaining to the
President the process by which atomic bombs were
65 Albert Einstein, "Enstein Letter to President Franklin
Roosevelt (August 2, 1939)," Bernard T. Field and Gertrud
Szilard, eds
.
, The Collected Works of Leo Szilard:
Scientific Papers (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), 199.
66 As previously stated, Szilard wrote the letter. He based
his presumptions about Nazi nuclear programs on the advances
of Hahn and Strassman - having no direct knowledge of their
involvement or lack thereof in state sponsored research.
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constructed. Not only did Szilard detail the foundations of
atomic energy (drawing billiard ball analogies) , but he also
wrote of the significance of uranium and the strategic
importance of securing the element. Near the end of his
letter, the energetic Szilard described how it may be
possible to construct "extremely dangerous bombs ... (whose)
destructive power can only be roughly estimated, but there




Many believe Einstein and Szilard were motivated by the
potential of obtaining funds for increased nuclear research
and informing the President of the possible repercussions
should Germany successfully construct an atomic bomb (so
they thought). 68 However, it is important to note that
their method of informing Roosevelt included using analogies
for atomic imagery. As physicists, they were keenly aware
of the potential of atomic bombs. As motivated elites they
were keenly aware of the power of imagery.
67 Ibid, 201. Szilard' s addendum.
68 See for example Bundy, Danger and Survival , and Richard
Hewitt and Oscar Anderson, The New World: A History of the
United States Atomic Energy Commission 1939-1946 (Berkeley:




Many pre-1945 novels, magazines, and movies fantasized
about an atomic era. Those I describe are representative in
content and format of the genre. From Wells, who introduced
the notion of atomic warfare, to Francis Lightfoot, who
boldly proclaimed the power of God from his possession of
atomic bombs, pre-1945 American popular culture contained
cultural referents for images of nuclear technology. The
explanatory power of such referents was enhanced by
statements by scientists, journalists, and influential
elites. As I demonstrate, these nuclear myths appeared at
a time when scientists were attaining increased social
prestige. When a chemist in the 1910' s stated that matter
could be changed, he was no longer a possessed alchemist; he
was a brilliant scientist acting independently from public
scrutiny. Authors and journalists listened to him; they
made him famous with tales of his exploits while often
adding their own interpretation of the consequences of an
atomic era.
The result, 30 years prior to Hiroshima, was a myth of
nuclear technology as immensely powerful and destructive.
This myth sprouted from social discourse. The myth of
atomic terror was born and thrived before 1945.
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III. NUCLEAR MYTHS AND OPERATIONAL CODES
"Everything about the atomic bomb is overshadowed by the
twin facts that it exists and its destructive power is
fantastically great."
Bernard Brodie
The images I present thrived long before atomic energy-
plants or atomic bombs. In fact, identifiable images about
the future utility of atomic technology preceded any
application of such technology. The pre-1945 images created
to represent the nuclear future, both Utopian and terror,
were socially constructed. Entering the consciousness of
the American public and influential elites through cultural
texts, these images evolved into nuclear myths.
Furthermore, elements of these socially constructed myths
were the core of collective beliefs used by U.S. decision
makers to account for their pursuit of atomic bombs.
The American image of atomic terror became the dominant
theme regarding the utility of nuclear technology by 1939.
This dominant theme permitted the funding and pursuit of
atomic bombs in 1939 (which I explain in Chapter IV) . This
chapter is a bridge from a sea of disparate cultural
referents to a coherent "operational code" belief about an
object yet to exist (atomic bombs)
.
69 This chapter serves
69 By "operational code belief, " I suggest that such beliefs
are more politically significant than ordinary "beliefs." I
argue that George's discussion of them can be applied to
beliefs about nuclear technology.
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two purposes: 1) to review existing literature which
connects beliefs to political outcomes, and 2) to
demonstrate that the imagery presented in chapter two
evolved from simple and distinct images, to nuclear myths,
and then into collective beliefs about the utility of atomic
technology. I describe how the images of atomic technology
became a "social discourse."
In this chapter, I discuss Alexander George's
"operational codes" and their potential effects on
decisions. This methodology, the "congruence procedure,"
attempts to establish consistencies between decisions by
policy makers and the beliefs held by those policy makers. 70
Myths about the utility of nuclear technology reached a
critical juncture in 1939.
When Einstein signed that letter to Roosevelt that
August, U.S. decision makers were familiar with the
scientific facts about atomic science. The repetition of
laboratory experiments had proven that the nuclear
bombardment of Uranium 235 released vast quantities of
energy. Potential applications to exploit that energy had
not yet been demonstrated empirically. In 1939, the U.S.
government was provided a viable, culturally acceptable
perception of how to exploit that energy in the form of
70 George, "The Causal Nexus," 105
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Einstein's letter. The autumn of 1939 was an important
moment in international history.
The imagery presented in chapter II generated
persuasive and suggestive perceptions regarding the utility
of atomic technology. The atomic future would be either
wonderful or terrible. These images became nuclear myths.
Nuclear myths were persuasive because they crossed
chronological thresholds and were dispersed in a manner
which solidified their status as "common sense." Indeed,
pre-1945 nuclear myths were illustrative of the "cultural
production of common sense." 71
A. CONGRUENCE AND OPERATIONAL CODES
George's "congruence procedure" assesses the impact of
the "operational code" belief of a policy maker on his or
her decisional choices. It is the process of demonstrating
consistency between a political belief and the content of
decisions. 72 Unfortunately, as with many social science
methodologies, the most definitive conclusion possible is
that the beliefs in question may have been a necessary
condition for the decision which resulted. It is difficult
71 Jeff Smith, Unthinking the Unthinkable: Nuclear Weapons
and Western Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1989), 17.
72 George, "The Causal Nexus," 105.
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to demonstrate sufficiency. In this case, the explanatory-
power of the "congruence procedure" is enhanced by the
reliance on myths. Because these myths existed before the
application of atomic technology, decision makers were
limited in their choices concerning what to believe. The
notion that the nuclear future was either Utopian or wrought
with terror, while opposite poles on the spectrum of nuclear
myths, were the only available perceptions regarding the
nuclear future to pre-1945 U.S. decision-makers. Therefore,
congruence between beliefs and action is made easier.
Cultural images of atomic technology provided the only
substance from which myths (and beliefs) about such
technology could be drawn.
George deliberately describes "operational code"
beliefs as inherently political. Such beliefs concern
"fundamental issues of politics, history, and political
action.
.
(they regard) the processing of available
information. .
.
(and the engagement) in rational calculation
in pursuit of values and interests." 73 Operational code
beliefs are "heuristical aides to decision making." 74
While there is no indisputable causal nexus between




possibility of deductively determining variables which
contribute to outcomes through the congruence method.
Operational code beliefs result from the processing of
available information. The question, then, becomes "how did
the myth of atomic terror, in 1939, become subjective
knowledge about the utility of atomic science?" More
specifically, how did this particular myth (as opposed to
the myth of atomic Utopia) become rational in the absence of
any concrete basis? The remainder of this chapter is
dedicated to illustrating that the myth of atomic terror
which facilitated the U.S. pursuit of atomic bombs was a
socially constructed system.
B. THE FORMATION OF DISCOURSE
A "discursive formation" describes, in a social
systemic context, a regularity of concepts, thematic
beliefs, types of statements and a specific system of
dispersion. 75 A discursive formation can be said to exist
when there are "regular relations .. .between styles of
description" of an object. 76 In this case, the writings of
Wells, the proclamations of Soddy, and the assertions of
Laurence clearly qualify as "regularity" of concepts and
75 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge (New York
Pantheon, 1972), 38.
76 Jon Simmons, Foucault and the Political (London:
Routledge, 1995), 24.
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styles of description. Wells, Soddy, and Laurence
consistently associated atomic weapons and nuclear
technology with atomic terror.
Similarly, the texts which indicated that the nuclear
future would be a Utopian paradise demonstrated regularity
in their styles of description. Senators and journalists
continually spoke of atomic powered locomotives and
airplanes. It is the repetition of similar themes in the
history of pre-1945 nuclear myths which permits their
characterization as a discursive formation. The discursive
formation of the utility of atomic technology, which existed
prior to any application of that technology, is the social
system encompassing the concepts and beliefs about that
speculative utility (utopia or terror)
.
Discursive formations appear as the result of
established relations between social processes,
institutions, and systems of norms. 77 They are formed
through the digestion of popular culture and the
socialization of ideas. This is a key concept. Discursive
formations do not appear as the result of assigning meaning
to objects; they do not necessarily come after an object
exists and demands interpretation on a macro-social level.
The significance of this is demonstrated through the
following proposition: if there is a social mechanism for
77 Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge , 45.
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the production of meaning, and it can be demonstrated that
such a mechanism has an historical basis, then the objects
on which meaning is based are less important than the
mechanism itself. Discursive formations are such
mechanisms.
"The atom of discourse," Foucault asserts, "...is the
statement." 78 "Statements," essentially, are language based
signs, concepts, perceptions, or categorical inferences.
They are ubiquitous symbols, representations of meaning,
which exist in the social world; symbols are "any
significant theme which spans the spheres of reality" 79
Symbols are similar to images and are therefore often
simplified for public consumption. Before 1920, the
statements of Wells and Soddy certainly "spanned the
spheres" of what was thought to be reality. Wells' accounts
of atomic battles and Soddy ' s statements about the earth as
a "storehouse of explosives" were symbolic because they
represented a new image. Similarly, subscribers to Harper '
s
magazine, while reading that atomic science provided the key




79 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction
of Reali ty (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 34.
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These images are "anonymously dispersed through
texts." 80 Coherent images about everyday life and politics
are formed and diffused by people rarely read about in
history books. Such anonymous "nucleators . . . are the true
entrepreneurs of society." 81 Boulding suggests the people
who possessed the creativity and imagination to articulate
the images, contribute significantly to organizing social
meaning. It is important to note that such entrepreneurs do
not ordinarily engage in conscious and diabolic attempts to
produce the building blocks of social myths. That is,
discursive formations are not pre-meditated. In this case,
the assertions of Wells, Soddy, Laurence, Harper T s et al
were the beginnings of burgeoning myths regarding nuclear
utility. They were the entrepreneurs. Certainly, their
statements were instrumental to the formation of a
discourse.
C. THE DYNAMICS OF DISCOURSE
Discursive formations have chronological thresholds
during which a process of legitimization and
institutionalization occurs. It is through these thresholds
that nuclear imagery is transformed into nuclear myths, and
80 Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge . 50.
81 Kenneth Boulding, The Image: Knowledge and Life in
Society (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), 76
44
then further refined as collective beliefs. The first such
threshold, the "threshold of positivity, " describes the
moment at which the discursive practice "achieves
individuality and autonomy." 82 The images inherent to the
practice are coherent and discernible. In this case, the
"threshold of positivity" for the discursive formation of
nuclear myths was achieved well before 1915. The revelation
that radioactivity was a sign of fundamental changes within
matter and Wells' accounts of atomic battles were autonomous
and coherent social images. Equally as coherent were the
images that atomic technology would bring forth an elixir of
life. Both types of "statements" would serve as catalysts
for subsequent articulations of atomic imagery.
Images of nuclear Utopia and nuclear terror, as polar
opposites existing within the same discourse during this
pre-1939 period, were "points of diffraction." "Points of
diffraction" are:
two concepts, in the same discourse. .. (which)
are then characterized as points of equivalence:
two incompatible (images) formed in the same way. .
.
the conditions of their appearance are identical
(and) they are situated at the same level. 83
Until 1939, the American public and U.S. decision-makers
were confronted with competing notions regarding the utility
12 Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge , 186
i3 Ibid, 65.
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of atomic science. While Soddy's idea that an atomic bomb
could destroy the earth may have been intriguing, it was
difficult to dismiss the image of atomic energy as Utopian.
The images appeared at approximately the same time and were
dispersed through the same media. It was unclear which path
would be selected until 1939.
After the "threshold of positivity, " a discursive
formation crosses a "threshold of epistemologization.
"
During this threshold "a group of statements claims to
validate norms of verification. .. and exercises a dominant
function." 84 At this point, certain concepts within the
discursive practice become more socially acceptable than
others; focused perceptions begin to dominate the discourse.
These focused perceptions, in this case, constitute the
nuclear myths regarding the alleged utility of atomic
technology. Texts which described atomic terror and atomic
Utopia were no longer detailing simple "images" - they were
describing refined nuclear myths regarding the future
utility of atomic technology.
The moment President Roosevelt was presented with
Einstein's letter in 1939 and said, in perhaps one of the
greatest under-statements in human history, "this requires
action, " myths of atomic terror would no longer be simply
"truths accepted uncritically." Myths of atomic terror, a
84 Ibid, 186.
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discursive formation, would soon become reality. 85 Atomic
technology as an immensely destructive force which provided
unheralded political power to the possessor became the
dominant theme surrounding atomic science. This is not to
say that responsibility for atomic weapons rests upon the
shoulders of Albert Einstein, Leo Szilard, and Franklin
Roosevelt. Developing the myths took years; Szilard,
Einstein, and Roosevelt were but partisans of a discourse
over which they had little control. The discursive practice
existed long before they were subjected to its social power.
Finally, discursive formations cross a "threshold of
formalization" during which the formation is able to "deploy
the formal edifice that it constitutes." 86 It is now, after
this threshold has been crossed, that it can be said that a
socially powerful and imposing discursive formation exists.
By "defining the axioms necessary to it, " the discursive
formation has evolved into subjective knowledge. 87
Technically, an "axiom" is a self-evident truth. Foucault
suggests that axioms of discourse become socially self-
evident truths, their truth being derived from their
85 See Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York:
Harper and Row, 1946) and Burns, Franklin Roosevelt: the
Soldi er of Freedom.
86 Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge , 187.
87 Ibid, 187.
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institutional and social status. It was no mistake that the
U.S. government searched nuclear movies for alleged German
atomic secrets during this period. 88 It was no mistake that
the U.S. government assembled the best physicists and
chemists available in New Mexico during the summer of 1943.
Henceforth, the discursive formation required cultural texts
to utilize the correct elements and styles of description.
The myth of atomic terror developed into a cognitive barrier
to competing perceptions regarding the utility of atomic
technology. The correct style of description, of course,
was that the future of atomic technology would mushroom into
atomic bombs.
D. SCIENCE AND OPERATIONAL CODES
The social prestige achieved by scientists during this
period was crucial to the dominance of the discursive
formation of atomic terror and therefore, the character of
the social discourse. By 1939, science and its
practitioners retained the public status and institutional
power to solidify the dominance of atomic terror. They did
this by using "inscription devices .. .which make the
perceptive judgement of others simpler." 89 Men such as
88 Broderick, Nuclear Movies , 57. The United States and the
Allies "carefully screened" the 1934 movie, G_o_ld., for Nazi
nuclear secrets.
89 Latour, "Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the
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Einstein and Szilard, as the official and public excavators
of social knowledge (theoretically valid social knowledge)
,
positioned themselves as authorities on nuclear science.
What they in fact became were the official and public
wardens of the discursive formation.
Myths regarding the utility of atomic technology were
no longer curiosities of popular culture. The volume and
consistency of atomic terror messages throughout this period
was substantial and, as Berger and Luckman assert, the
"reality' of the social world gains in massivity in the
course of its transmission." 90 Scientists provided the
impetus for coherent, collective operational code beliefs
about nuclear technology. Early in the twentieth century
they sold the notion that atomic science was "important" to
American policy-makers and the public. From 1900-1939,
vocal and powerful members of the scientific community
repeatedly framed atomic achievements with destructive
imagery and national power. After that, they were crucial
to the refinement of that imagery into nuclear myths. All
the while, scientists were harvesting increased social
prestige. Suddenly, when a scientist stated that the earth
could be destroyed by an atomic bomb, it became much easier
World," 161.
90 Berger and Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality ,
58.
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to believe a movie which detailed the exploits of physics
minded international terrorists intent on doing just that.
Scientists opened the door to the discursive formation of




Speculative images regarding the utility of atomic
technology were socially constructed. Over time, such
speculative images evolved into nuclear myths. The socially
constructed system encompassing nuclear myths, the
"discursive formation" of atomic technology, was dispersed
through cultural media and statements by influential elites.
Chronologically, nuclear myths matured as the focus of
atomic science narrowed on methods by which energy could be
released from bombardment of nuclear constructions. In
1939, the dilemma of two competing perceptions was solved
through the skillful politicking of scientists - scientists
who were crucial to the development of collective beliefs
about the utility of atomic technology. Atomic terror
became the dominant theme
.
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IV. NUCLEAR MYTHS AND NUCLEAR BOMBS
"I refuse to work full time to make the culmination of
three centuries of physics a weapon of mass destruction."
I. I. Rabi to Robert Oppenheimer in 1942
In 1939, the myth of atomic terror was the rational and
collective "operational code" belief that resourceful U.S.
elites needed to "go nuclear." Forty years in the making,
the maturation of this collective belief stirred hopes of
"the old dream of cracking a cup full of atoms." From
Frederick Soddy to Leo Szilard, from The World Set Free to
The Greatest Power
r the myth of atomic terror was refined,
transformed, and substantiated. President Roosevelt, acting
on this substantiation, is a decision maker who was
persuaded by nuclear myths. The manifestations of this
persuasion occurred between 1939 and 1943.
This section details the pertinent personalities and
events which led to the establishment of the Los Alamos
Laboratory in New Mexico. Though the United States did not
actually possess an atomic bomb until 1945, the period which
is most politically significant is from 1939 to 1943. It
was during this period that rational nuclear myths, a
culmination of the process described in Chapters II and III,
were the decisive factor in U.S. nuclear decision-making.
This chapter serves two purposes: 1) to historically
trace U.S. atomic milestones from 1939 to 1943 while
discussing the influential elites who pushed the process of
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development; and 2) to examine the general decision making
process attributed to Roosevelt - with specific comments
regarding his thoughts on the atomic bomb. The beliefs of
influential elites and Rooseveltian decision-making,
unorthodox as it was, combined to form the immediate causal
nexus for U.S. proliferation. While nuclear beliefs remain
the focus, they need to be transmitted, shared, and
processed to become politically important.
A. THE CRUCIAL YEARS: 1939-1943
The Einstein and Szilard letters were delivered to
Roosevelt by New York financier and occasional presidential
advisor, Alexander Sachs. Upon hearing the fears of
Einstein and Szilard, Sachs decided that he would alert the
President to the recent advancements in physics. He had
worked among Roosevelt's speech writers during the campaign
of 1932 and was familiar with Roosevelt's decision making
process. On October 11, 1939, Sachs summarized to the
President the potential of atomic energy and what should be
done. As Richard Rhodes notes:
The letter emphasized energy production first,
radioactive materials for medical use second,
and 'bombs of hitherto unenvisaged potency and
scope' third. It proposed a government agency
to act as liaison between scientific research
and Roosevelt. 91
91 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb , 314. Sachs simply
presented Roosevelt with Einstein and Szilard' s letters, he
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Ending his presentation to the President, Sachs quoted from
a 1938 article in Background in Modern Science when he said,
"We... can only hope (that humankind will not use atomic
energy) exclusively in blowing up his next door neighbor." 92
To that Roosevelt replied, "Alex, what you are after is to
see that the Nazi's don't blow us up" and then, "this
requires action." 93 The "action" from 1939 to 1943 shaped
both the method by which the United States would pursue the
bomb and the essential personalities of the pursuit.
The immediate result of the Sachs meeting was the
establishment of a subcommittee of the Bureau of Standards,
the organization charged with applying science to the
national interest. This committee, subsequently named the
Advisory Committee on Uranium, convened ten days after the
Sachs-Roosevelt meeting. Among the attendees were Leo
Szilard, an Army and a Navy representative, the chairman of
the Bureau of Standards, and Sachs.
The committee was convinced by Szilard and Sachs that
scientific research exploring the feasibility of
constructing atomic bombs was worth funding. The
presented Roosevelt with Einstein and Szilard' s letters, he
did not read them. Instead, he drafted his own letter which
he read to Roosevelt.
92 Quoted in ibid, 314.
93 Quoted in Burns, Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom . 250.
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information memorandum which was forwarded to the President
stated that, "atomic bombs (in terms of destructiveness
would be) vastly greater than anything now known." 94 At
this point, atomic research remained scattered and without a
coherent, military purpose. There were scientists across
the United States who were pursuing increased knowledge
about nuclear chain reactions, but they were doing so in
different experimental manners and largely without close
interaction.
Leaving the meeting, Leo Szilard was convinced that the
U.S. government finally was taking the appropriate steps to
construct atomic bombs. Curiously, Szilard is described as
being "astonished" that Sachs agreed with him that atomic
science was a matter "too important to wait." 95 This is
"curious" because Szilard, more than anyone else, had done
the most to bring the "old dream" to fruition - "he was at
his best goading others into action." 96 It was he who had
patented the process of constructing atomic bombs in 1936;
it was he who had prodded Einstein to get involved; it was
he who had told William Laurence that "the world was headed
for grief;" and it was he who was "impatient" and "chafed"
94 Quoted in Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb , 317
95 Ibid, 316.
96 Hewlett and Anderson, The New World , 15.
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over the U.S. government's apparent lack of concern up until
1939. 97
Szilard's addendum to Einstein's letter to the
President was not his only foray into dispersing nuclear
myths. 98 Rhodes asserts that none other than H. G. Wells
was an "influential acquaintance" of Szilard. 99 So
"influential" was Wells that Szilard quotes him in a paper
he submitted to The Physical Review in 1940. The paper,
"Divergent Chain Reactions in Systems Composed of Uranium
and Carbon," begins with the following sentence:
As early as 1913 H. G. Wells forecast the discovery
of induced radioactivity for the year 1933 and
described the subsequent advent of nuclear
transmutations on an industrial scale. 100
Wells discusses the "advent of nuclear transmutations on an
industrial scale" in only one of his books, the book Szilard
noted, The World Set Free . Szilard's use of this book
97 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb . 312, 331.
98 Szilard was what Lavoy refers to as a "nuclear myth
maker." I reiterate that Szilard was not consciously
manipulating nuclear myths to further an agenda - he was
using nuclear myths to further an agenda because those myths
were rational to him.
99 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb . 14. Szilard met
Wells in London in 1929 in an attempt to get Central
European copyrights to one of his books.
100 Leo Szilard, "Divergent Chain Reactions in Systems
Composed of Uranium and Carbon, " submitted to the Physical
Review , February, 1940, printed in Feld and Szilard, eds
.
,
The Collected Works of Leo Szilard: Scientific Papers. 218.
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affirms the significance of nuclear myths. It affirms that
atomic based cultural texts shaped understandings of atomic
science. In any case, Szilard continued to press the
American government throughout the next two years to
accelerate their program.
Very little occurred between the late October 1939
meeting and the middle of 1940. In June of that year an
able and resourceful administrator, Vannevar Bush, quit his
job as president of the Carnegie Institute. According to
him, a void existed in U. S. nuclear research. His
specialty, as he writes it, was redressing "the complete
lack of proper liaison between the military and the civilian
(sectors) in the development of weapons." 101 Bush visited
the Army, Navy, Congress, and the National Academy of
Scientists seeking ideas on how to narrow the focus of
atomic research.
In the middle of June, Bush convinced the President to
establish the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC)
with him as its supervisor. This committee immediately
absorbed the Uranium Committee and severed military
leadership from atomic research. 102 Bush provided what
101 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb , 336.
102 The Uranium Committee continued to function, just under
the auspices of the NDRC. In fact, in May 1941, the Uranium
Committee sponsored a report from the National Academy of
Scientists which stated that militarily uses of atomic
fission could occur three ways: "production of violently
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Szilard had been seeking for over one year - direct ties to
the White House for atomic science research. The NDRC would
control the funding and act as liaison between the
scientists and the White House while the Uranium Committee
would continue to direct research. Bush is described as
"indispensable" to the development of the U.S. atomic
bomb. 103
It was not until later that Bush believed that atomic
bombs could be built. Convinced that pursuing weapons which
could destroy entire cities was a waste of effort, he was
"initially more interested in proving the impossibility of
such a weapon." 104 A little over one year later, after
mingling with imaginative and myth-producing scientists,
Bush wrote to the President in his official capacity as
director of the NDRC, "if such an explosive were made it
would be thousands of times more powerful than existing
explosives, and its use might be determining." 105
The NDRC/Uranium Committee structure suffered, however,
from an inability to coordinate effectively the activities
radioactive materials to spread over enemy territory; a
power source on submarines and other ships; and production
of violently explosive atomic bombs." See Rhodes, The
Making of the Atomic Bomb , 365.
103 Bundy, Danger and Survival. 39.
104 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb , 338.
105 Bundy, Danger and Survival. 44.
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of atomic scientists spread throughout the country. The
Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) , which
was established by an Executive Order in June 1941, was
Bush's effort both to amass more authority over the national
research effort and to apply scientific research to national
defense. 106 The previous year had been filled with
scientific advances which inched the United States yet
closer to achieving atomic bombs; however, there remained a
lack of coherent focus in their efforts. Administrative and
coherent focus would come shortly after the summer of 1941.
In 1941, England also had a nationally funded
organization dedicated to coordinating atomic research.
This group, the "MAUD" committee, shared nearly all of its
information with the OSRD. 107 By summer 1941, a technical
subcommittee of MAUD confirmed that atomic bombs were
feasible through the neutron-induced fission of Uranium 235:
"the chain reaction would be so fast that an explosion of
tremendous force would take place." 108 The National Academy
106 Hewlett and Anderson, The New World , 41.
107
"maUD" was supposedly a secret anagram for "radium
taken." In fact, it was the first name of the school
teacher who had taught Niels Bohr's family English. See
Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb , 341.
108 There are various versions of how this information was
given to U. S. leadership — but there is little
disagreement over the significance of it. The MAUD report
illustrated a path to detonating an atomic bomb. See
Hewlett and Anderson, New World Order , 41-42, and Rhodes,
The Making of the Atomic Bomb, 368-369.
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of Scientists (NAS) perused the report from MAUD containing
this information and produced their own report for the OSRD
and Bush. The NAS concluded that the British had indeed
demonstrated a practical method of producing atomic bombs -
and recommended that U. S. research be expedited to produce
Uranium-based atomic bombs. 109
Bush delivered this information to Roosevelt in
November 1941. Prominent among the assertions of the report
were two aspects of the myth of atomic terror, aspects
Roosevelt could not possibly have ignored: 1) "a fission
bomb of superlative destructive power" is possible, and 2)
"adequate care of our national defense seems to demand
urgent development of this program (the development of an
Uranium bomb)." 110 This report came from a "scientific"
organization. The scientists were telling Roosevelt not
only that bombs were possible (something he might or might
not previously have believed) , but that those bombs were
essential to national security. It seems the American
nuclear scientists were "in the service of a value," 111 a
value important to Roosevelt. Nonetheless, the President
109 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb . 369.
110 Quoted in, Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb , 3 8 6-
387.




mulled over Bush's report for two months before responding.
The approval to focus American research on a uranium bomb
came in January 1942.
At first, Bush and the OSRD farmed out the various
steps to achieving the bomb to the established laboratories
across the country. Research continued at Berkeley,
Columbia, Chicago, and Tennessee; however, Bush had bigger
goals in mind. His idea was to set up a central laboratory
which would permit the scientists to interact and profit
from each other's research. As important to Bush and
Roosevelt was the increased security achieved through
central location of atomic research. It was in 1942 that
the names synonymous with the American bomb entered the
national scene.
As important as General Leslie Groves, Robert
Oppenheimer, and the scientists who went to Los Alamos were
to the development the American atomic bomb, their role in
the decision to launch the program was negligible. By the
time their massive contributions were made, the political
decisions which facilitated their involvement were
completed.
The historical events after 1942 are familiar. Groves
traveled to the various laboratories to reconnoiter a
scientific leader for the lab, selected Oppenheimer (not a
popular proposition) , and the site in New Mexico was agreed
upon. It is interesting to note that many crucial
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scientists initially resisted the idea of a centralized,
military-run atomic laboratory. In fact, many were
concerned that such a laboratory would threaten their
inviolate "scientific autonomy." 112 Perhaps the comfort of
their own laboratories provided the only acceptable impetus
for scientific research. In any case, the scientists were
persuaded that they could continue their research free from
critical, government-sponsored examination, they began
arriving at Los Alamos in March 1943.
The period from Roosevelt's meeting with Sachs to the
establishment of the Los Alamos lab is crucial to the
development of the American atomic bomb. While it is true
that there was much momentum associated with the scientific
progress toward constructing an atomic bomb, the decision to
pursue the weapon ultimately rested with Roosevelt.
Roosevelt was bombarded with nuclear myths to assist him in
his decision-making. It was these myths that became common
sense to Roosevelt.
B. NUCLEAR BOMBARDMENT: MYTHS AND NEUTRONS
Is it possible to reconstruct Franklin Roosevelt's
views on the utility of atomic bombs? Probably not. He did
not live to see them used nor did he leave behind voluminous
112 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb . 454. The nuclear
physicist revolt in the name of "scientific autonomy" was
led by Rabi at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
61
information regarding his thoughts on the subject. Indeed,
very little primary source material remains regarding
Roosevelt's nuclear beliefs. What is clear, though, is that
he was impressed with the offensive capabilities of an
atomic bomb. Also, his primary nuclear lieutenant (Bush)
focused on that offensive capability in nearly all of his
communication to the President. There is no scarcity of
information regarding what Roosevelt was told about an
atomic bomb.
Perhaps it is safe to assume that atomic weapons were
not very high on Roosevelt's agenda. Certainly he was more
concerned with the immediate consequences of international
conflict. For Roosevelt, World War II was the international
debut for the United States; Roosevelt was convinced from
the very beginning that the war would substantially alter
the landscape of international relations. 113 Indeed, it
would alter that landscape in such a way as to confirm
American supremacy. Roosevelt undoubtedly saw the atomic
bomb as only a part of this eventuality. I draw inferences
about Roosevelt's motivations to pursue the bombs from his
general decision-making process, what people told him about
the bombs, and the manner in which he pursued them.
113 For information regarding Roosevelt's general views on
Europe, European conflict, and the role of the United States
in a post-war world see John Harper, American Visions of
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
.
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One of Roosevelt's cabinet members, describing how
Roosevelt reached decisions, stated the following:
he worked with human and moral values... he relied
upon his intuitive judgment .. .drew from his
memory. . .exercised imagination. . .and came to his
decision and judgment by a combination of all
these qualities. 114
In other words, Roosevelt was not unlike other leaders who
"have to act on their beliefs about the world." 115 He drew
from past experiences and attempted to frame new information
into a particular cognitive framework. Roosevelt was, "both
realist and idealist." 116 Roosevelt, then, was a great
American "pragmatist . " 117 He believed, most of all, in
doing something. 118
Information or beliefs which became common sense to
Roosevelt were results of a process. Apparently, the
114 Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew , 163.
115 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 216.
116 Burns, Soldier of Freedom , 550.
117 My use of the term "pragmatist" is "Jamesian." The term
describes a traditional American attribute and has two broad
implications in American culture: 1) individual reliance,
and 2) the ability to devise quick and practical responses
to problems. See William James, Pragmatism and Four Essays
from the Meaning of Truth (New York: New American Library,
1955) .
118 Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew , 164. Roosevelt is quoted
as having often said, "We have to do something. We have to
do the best we know how to do at this moment. We can modify
it later."
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criteria for that process included listening to trusted
advisors, using imagination, relying on memory, and drawing
from traditional, cultural American attributes. As
President of the United States, Roosevelt was continually
compelled to act upon available information. It seems that




Roosevelt's response to Sachs' plea for governmental
action is illustrative of this proposition. The assertion
that Sachs was "after not seeing the Nazi's blow us up"
demonstrates how the President responded first to the
individual and then to the problem. I believe Roosevelt did
not fear a Nazi atomic bomb - but I also believe he thought
Sachs feared it. If Roosevelt did fear a Nazi atomic bomb,
might not the "action" he require include finding out all
available information regarding such a bomb? Or asking
Sachs what he knew of such a bomb? Who knew of such a bomb?
Probably so. The fact is that Roosevelt's immediate
"action" was a response to another aspect of Sachs'
presentation - it was a response to bombs of "hitherto
unenvisioned potency and scope." Atomic bombs were valued
by Roosevelt for their potential offensive capabilities and
119 Bundy, Danger and Survival . 47. Bundy asserts, as I do,
that Roosevelt resisted "one-man proposals." However, not
one person who saw Roosevelt concerning atomic science was
turned away dissatisfied.
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not as counter-weights to an alleged German program that he
did not fear.
Franklin Roosevelt, by all accounts, had a "meager
scientific education." 120 The intricacies of atomic science
bored him. He had no interest in understanding what Uranium
isotopes were let alone the process by which they are
separated from Uranium. Vannevar Bush knew this. Nearly
all of Bush's reports to Roosevelt during the early 1940'
s
are teeming with applications of atomic energy. They are
teeming with myths of atomic terror. Bush consistently
prefaced scientific advancements with destructive nuclear
myths
.
It was Bush who told the President that atomic bombs
would be more explosive than anything known and whose use
would be determining. Bush said that in 1941; Soddy said it
in 1903. It was Bush who delivered the National Academy of
Scientists report which discussed the feasibility of a
Uranium bomb, but this was discussed only in the context of
such a bomb's potential destructiveness . Bush said that in
1942; Wells said that in 1914. The fact is that the people
who had access to Roosevelt, the people he trusted because
they were "truthful and wise," 121 were "spoon feeding" him
120 Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, 164.
121 Ibid, 164. Perkins describes how Roosevelt, like the
American public, felt this way about all scientists.
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atomic terror myths. The bombardment of neutrons in
scientific laboratories was not the only "bombardment" going
on. Roosevelt, with exception of the Sachs meeting, was
never really provided with any other way but atomic terror
to think about nuclear technology. Judging from his
response to the Sachs meeting, he probably would not have
listened to atomic Utopia myths anyway.
Jervis says, "the greater the number of analogies
available to a (leader) , the less will be the influence of
each (analogy)." 122 The inverse of this proposition,
obviously, is that the fewer the analogies, the more
significant each becomes. Roosevelt was susceptible to the
atomic terror myth because it was his only "analogy." It
was his only analogy for two primary reasons: 1) collective
beliefs about atomic terror had evolved, through a social
process, into a dominant and hegemonic social theme, and
consequently, 2) it was the only coherent belief he was
presented. The President was "coerced" into pursuing atomic
bombs because his beliefs about those atomic bombs were
socially constructed subjective knowledge.
C. CONCLUSION
The U.S. decision to "go nuclear" has been examined
exhaustively. There is wide agreement over the
122 Jervis, Perception and Misperception , 269.
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chronological events from 1939 to the establishment of the
Los Alamos laboratory. Ignored in almost all of this
research is the way U.S. leaders thought and talked about
nuclear weapons before any weapon existed. The social
discourse is ignored. Clearly, myths regarding the utility
of atomic technology saturated nearly all communications
regarding atomic research to the President. To Roosevelt,
physics was interesting not "because it was there" but
instead because of what people told him it could do for him.
More specifically, nuclear weapons had already come to
signify political power for Roosevelt.
I assert that the result of this myth proliferation may
have been nuclear proliferation. Roosevelt was inundated
with atomic terror myths. These atomic terror myths were
rooted, shaped, and substantiated in pre-1945 American
cultural texts. If it is true that beliefs are important in





Traditional explanations of the U.S. decision to "go
nuclear" stress two important factors in U. S. decision
making: 1) German nuclear activity, and 2) Einstein's letter
describing atomic terror. Einstein's letter is significant,
it is often written, against the backdrop of impending war
with Germany and the consequences of a Nazi bomb.
Einstein's letter is indeed significant, but not because of
the imagined and post-scripted German context. The argument
that the United States sought atomic bombs to counter German
research is consistent with realist proliferation theories.
The problem remains, however, that such arguments are not
totally consistent with historical facts or with the
documented perceptions of the key decision-maker, Roosevelt.
On the other hand, there were discernible cultural
referents which provided coherent perceptions regarding the
future utility of atomic technology. Such referents evolved
over time and were substantiated by American elites. They
were also used by Einstein in his letter to Roosevelt. By
1939 the most powerful and persuasive of those referents,
the myth of atomic terror, had become culturally-produced
"common sense." As such, atomic science was presented to
Roosevelt as a tool for producing immensely destructive and
politically powerful atomic bombs.
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Roosevelt believed in the offensive potential of atomic
weapons. He was not compelled to choose a desired atomic
myth because he was, essentially, never given a choice. The
United States aspired to and acquired nuclear weapons as a
result of socially constructed and widely dispersed nuclear
myths
.
This thesis began with the emergence of images of
nuclear technology. Such images were present in elements of
popular culture, widely disseminated periodicals, and
statements by social elites. From 1900 to 1945, the images
were refined, clarified, and dispersed to the highest
echelons of American government. By the time they reached
the President of the United States, they were myths about
the future utility of atomic technology. Roosevelt was
privy to the myth of atomic terror. It was that myth which
might have eventually caused American nuclear scientists to
gather at Los Alamos in 1943.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDING
Socially constructed nuclear myths precipitate nuclear
desires. Desires emerge from beliefs, and as Jervis states,
"leaders must act on their beliefs." In the case of nuclear
technology, beliefs about nuclear weapons arise from a
social discourse. Of course, there now exist real events
with which to connect the power of nuclear technology.
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Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Three Mile Island, and Chernobyl
are examples nuclear technology's destructive potential.
That these events occurred, are significant, and caused
widespread disaster are not in dispute. However, in the
context of beliefs about the utility of atomic technology,
Hiroshima, Three Mile Island, etc., are significant only for
the manner in which their chaos was represented.
Understanding this representation, the nuclear myths about
those events whose truth is accepted uncritically, is
imperative to understanding nuclear beliefs. Such myths are
now included in the social discourse. Perhaps social
discourses, this new level of analysis, will explain
contemporary cases of nuclear aspirations.
The beginnings of the U.S. nuclear program can be
traced as far back as H. G. Wells and Fredrick Soddy. The
images they created to represent nuclear technology
demonstrated remarkable longevity and consistency over 40
years. Such images were passed between and among other
texts, scientists, and journalists. Such images were the
basis for a social discourse.
Further use of the "social discourse" level of analysis
might prove fruitful to understanding why countries want
nuclear weapons. A study at this level would require the
investigator to thoroughly examine popular cultural media,
mass distributed periodicals, and statements by influential
elites. From this examination, the investigator may
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determine the prevailing nuclear myths. 123 It is from these
prevailing nuclear myths that inferences about the nature of
the social discourse may be drawn.
Perhaps there are also general hypotheses which can be
formulated through the social discourse level of analysis.
For example, if the prevailing nuclear myths in the country
under consideration describe atomic technology as an
immensely destructive force, then decision makers may be
predisposed to believe that such a destructive force is
politically useful. If decision makers believe nuclear
weapons are politically useful, then they might desire
nuclear weapons. By contrast, if nuclear myths describe
atomic technology as the key to a bountiful paradise, then
maybe decision makers will pursue avenues to achieve such a
paradise. The crucial element, however, is the nature of
the nuclear myths. By studying nuclear myths, proliferation
investigators will trace the causal chain to nuclear desires
as far back as possible. A diagram of a potential theory,
as contrasted to traditional explanations, would appear as
follows
:
123 Nuclear myths, clearly, are case specific. As they are
based upon cultural texts and domestic phenomena, nuclear
myths arise from case-specific variables.
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Figure 1: Line diagrams of Nuclear Myth Theory
and traditional explanations for Nuclear
proliferation
IMPETUS a: Potential Nuclear Myth Theory
IMAGES INTERPRETATION OD*mOME
Movies

















In this diagram, the "impetus" is the motivating variable
which initiates thought about nuclear weapons. At the
nature of the social discourse level of analysis, the
impetus is provided through images presented in cultural
texts. Traditional explanations, remaining at the decision-
maker or international level of analysis, rely on external
phenomena to explain the impetus. The "interpretation" of
that impetus is the source of desires for nuclear weapons.
I believe nuclear myths may be the source, realists assert
notions of security and prestige are the source. Finally,
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the "outcome" of that interpretation is the desire for
nuclear weapons.
Because images presented in cultural texts are socially
constructed, and such images become nuclear myths, then
nuclear myths might or might not be empirically verifiable.
That is, the content of truth in nuclear myths might or
might not be evaluated. Nuclear myths are not significant
because they may or may not be true, they are significant
because people believe them.
Brodie's assertion that everything about nuclear
weapons is overshadowed by the fact that they exist is
incorrect. While nuclear weapons do exist and undoubtedly
are immensely destructive, this is not the key to
understanding why people want them. What people believe
about atomic bombs and the sources of those beliefs are
germane
.
B. NUCLEAR MYTHS AND U.S. INTELLIGENCE
There are clear policy and intelligence ramifications
derived from this approach. U.S. intelligence has been
mandated to provide information regarding the motivations of
states who desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Currently,
U.S. military intelligence funding and effort in this regard
has been negligible. Many U.S. intelligence organizations
maintain that nuclear desires arise from security threats or
aspirations for international prestige. While such a focus
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may provide hints regarding why certain countries pursue
nuclear weapons, alternative levels of analysis must be
explored.
I suggest that human intelligence assets may be useful
in understanding nuclear desires. In fact, to obtain any
meaningful awareness of a suspect country's customs,
beliefs, and traditions, American intelligence assets are
required to immerse themselves into that country's culture.
Even then, there is no guarantee that consequential
information regarding the sources of beliefs will become
clear. Misunderstandings will remain the norm. However,
U.S. intelligence, much like Roosevelt, has no choice.
Useful knowledge concerning nuclear desires can only result
from useful knowledge concerning nuclear beliefs. Clearly,
nuclear beliefs stem from socially constructed, dispersed,
and perpetuated cultural systems.
Therefore, I recommend that U.S. intelligence assets
organize their collection efforts in the following manner:
1) recognize that not all desires for nuclear weapons stem
from realist paradigms, 2) acknowledge that perhaps
culturally produced collective beliefs influence decision-
makers, 3) understand that those beliefs will be manifested
in cultural texts (movies, books, magazines) , daily
periodicals, and statements by influential social elites,
and 4) attempt to connect the beliefs described above with
either state action or statements by policy makers. I
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assert that should U.S. intelligence focus on these four
recommendations, meaningful understanding about the initial
sources of nuclear desires will emerge.
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